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TARGETING IN MILITARY OPERATIONS ON URBANIZED TERRAIN (MOUT)
The Somalia Perspective
by MAJ John Crary, Collection Division

Precision, or MOUT targeting, can require a unique approval process. Detailed information about the target and engagement options is required. Without this information, nonapproval from higher headquarters is virtually guaranteed.

Several factors go into the targeting decide-detect-deliver model when MOUT operations are considered. The headquarter's approval level of the mission dictates the essential elements of information required. Proximity of buildings and friendly troops, possible collateral damage, protected areas, weapons options and effects, reliability of target information and the criticality of the target to the success of the ground commander's mission are all considered within the detailed target planning and approval process.

The possible political sensitivity of engaging MOUT targets can place the approval for engagement of those targets at command levels much higher than the requesting commander. At times, this process may involve obtaining national command authority for target engagement. The approval process, required information and the ground commander's intent must be known and completely understood by the targeting team.

National command approval for target engagement in Somalia required four essential elements of information as follows: military significance of the target, reliability of the targeting information, extent of possible collateral damage and engagement weapon options. Moreover, extensive time and effort were spent researching and compiling required information concerning the characteristics and effects of munitions available in theater. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) and target analysis can be time-consuming and tedious tasks, but they are necessities for the approval process from the tactical commander through the unified commander to the National Command Authority. The use of target folders greatly assisted Joint Task Force Somalia fire support element as a tool to file and manage the volume of information needed for each MOUT target.

In the city of Mogadishu, two engagement concerns were considered critical within the targeting process. They were troop safety and collateral damage. These two paramount considerations demanded precision delivery of any munition. Options for fire support teams in MOUT will probably be limited to the use of laser-guided munitions. Fire support personnel must be completely familiar with the characteristics and employment considerations in the use of these munitions. NFTF!

MY OBSERVATIONS

COL Roger Spickelmier, Dir, CALL

With this issue of NFTF!, we begin to shift away from predominatly Somalia lessons toward more current operations and CALL programs. In future issues, we will continue to report on Lessons from Somalia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FRYOM), but will emphasize recent exercises and lessons from the CTCs. While we prefer to limit items on CALL-specific programs in NFTF!, we do address two programs in this issue that are of particular importance in providing service to the field.

The first area is the TRADOC Remedial Action Program, or T-RAP. T-RAP is an issue management system to identify responsible agencies within TRADOC for issue resolution and provide a method of tracking corrective actions. Eighty percent of the issues identified during exercises and operations are solved within TRADOC. Thus, T-RAP complements and works within ARAP and JULLS/RAP.

The other issue is a brief synopsis of the Combined Arms Assessment Team, or CAAT. Many of our readers have provided input to issues for CAATs, dealt with CAATs during deployments, or have been members of a CALL CAAT. CAATs are the primary "active" collection method CALL uses to obtain quality observations and provide lessons to the Army.

As always, if you should have areas or questions you would like us to research, or information you believe we should add to any of our products, contact CALL. NFTF!

COL Roger Spickelmier,
Dir, CALL

BATTLE COMMAND-FOCUSED COMBAT TRAINING CENTER (CTC) ROTATIONS

**by CPT George E. Dodge and Major James C. Madigan, Senior Project Officers,
Battle Command Battle Laboratory (BCBL)**

The term "battle command," as a separate combat function in doctrine, is new since the publication of FM 100-5, Operations, in June 1993. However; battle command has been practiced by commanders throughout the history of warfare. Its introduction is the result of a deliberate process the U. S. Army has undergone to adjust to significant changes in an evolutionary, but timely, manner. The aim of the battle command concept is to distinguish the essence of command (what the commander does) from its implementing functions (the hardware, technology, and organizations that support commanders). Focus on the commander will prevent the U. S. Army from being captured by the current worn-out C2 engine (command post fixations, large tactical staffs, and current programs) as the U. S. Army moves into the information age.

Battle command is the art of battle decisionmaking, leading, and motivating soldiers and units into action. It includes the commander's ability to visualize the current and future states, then formulate concepts of operations to get from one to the other at least cost. It is a dynamic and repetitive process. The current vision of battle command includes fundamentally competent commanders who have the necessary intuitive sense of operational units and soldiers and who are able to visualize the battlefield.

Understanding how commanders develop and execute battle-focused leadership and battle judgement is the goal of the battle command-focused CTC rotation program. The result of these focused rotations will be a battle command benchmark from which the U. S. Army can institutionally adjust competencies and enable technologies to meet Force XXI requirements.

The purpose of this task is threefold. First, examine battle command competencies required during planning, preparation, and execution of operations. Secondly, identify information needs and shortfalls and then link the shortfalls to information technology requirements. Finally, focus on how we teach, coach, and mentor battle command.

BCBL formed the Battle Command Action Team (BCAT) consisting of members from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Army Research Institute (ARI), Center for Army Leadership (CAL), School of Command Preparation, the Engineer School, the Artillery School, and Combined Arms Command-Training to accomplish this mission. The BCAT is researching archived CTC data and is interviewing former commanders, subject matter experts, and observer/controllers in addition to observing commanders at the CTCs during focused rotations.

Three battle command-focused rotations are planned this fiscal year. The first was recently completed at the NTC. The JRTC-focused rotation is scheduled later this summer and coordination for the BCTP-focused rotation is pending. Four battle command-focused rotations are planned for next year at each of the CTCs and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC).

Initial impressions from the NTC rotation are encouraging. Commanders can be observed and data collected with minimal impact on training. BCBL has gained insight into the fundamental knowledge and baseline skills required for commanders to perform in a tactical situation. There are new insights into how information flows and decision management supports battle commanders. In short, there is a good start toward understanding the commander's craft, how it is practiced, and how it is learned. However, the collection process must be fine-tuned and must continue to work the other two sources of data: archived CTC records and interviews with former commanders, SMEs, and O/Cs.

Nine research hypotheses were formulated based on the mission statement. Three address competencies; five address information shortfalls; and one addresses teaching, coaching, and mentoring battle command. The correctness of the hypotheses is important. They drive data collection and form the foundation for mission success.

Data collectors were selected from the Tactical Commander's Development Course, the Engineer School, the Artillery School, and CAL. Every effort was made to match rank, experience, and branch between the data collector and the observed commander. A behavioral scientist from ARI was paired with a LTC of the same branch and background. Covering down on task force commanders proved to be a powerful combination for observing and understanding commander behavior.

BCBL, with ARI and CALL, developed and conducted a data collector training program to ensure data collectors had a baseline background and common frame of reference. CALL developed a computerized data base for inputting observations. The challenge collecting data on commanders is difficult. There are so many variables that it is not possible to anticipate (write and index) all of the questions prior to a rotation. As a result, data collection formats and training are very important. An open-ended narrative data collection card was developed for each of the areas of interest. Data collectors, riding with Ocs, observed commanders in action and recorded over 500 observations.

More information will be forthcoming in a CALL CTC Quarterly Bulletin. Your support and input are welcome. The POC at BCBL is MAJ James C. Madigan or CPT George E. Dodge. Telephone DSN 552-4495, Coml (913)682-3342; FAX, DSN 552-2842, Coml 913-6842842. NFTF!

THE COMBINED ARMS ASSESSMENT TEAM (CAAT)
by MAJ Phillip Parker and CPT Chris Hughes, Cbt Mavr Analysts

CAATs are the primary active collection method CALL uses to gather quality observations and provide lessons to the U. S. Army. The results of a CAAT are published in lessons learned reports, newsletters, AARs and News From The Front! publications. Additionally, briefings are conducted by the team chief or members of the CAAT to the Senior Army Leadership.

A CAAT may be directed, requested or implied under the Wartime Army Lessons Learned Program (WALLP) or the TRADOC Support to Exercise (STE) Program. Directed collections come from the CSA; Commander, TRADOC; or Commander, CAC. Requested collections may come from Theater CINCs, Army component commanders, and general officer-level staffs- - such as the J3 for the ARRC, or USAREUR DCSOPS. For requested or implied collections, the CAC Commander is the approving authority. Funding is normally provided by the requestor. Funding is requested from the supported unit for implied missions.

After determining the requirement for a CAAT, the collection issues are identified. Agencies requesting or directing the CAAT will normally identify major issues. Subissues are then identified through coordination with the in-theater staff. Based on the issues and focus, a team chief and subject matter expert (SME) team members are identified. Team chiefs are personally selected by the CSA, the TRADOC Commander or the CAC Commander. Generally, a Colonel or higher is selected for a major CAAT effort. For important, but smaller, CAATs, excellent results have also been achieved by using War College Fellows.

CALL maintains a listing of SMEs from throughout the U. S. Army. A formal message request for support is sent to the location of the required SME. Proponents normally view membership in a CAAT as an opportunity to collect observations (future lessons) in country. The recent support for both Wartime and STE CAATs has been excellent.

The following is a type chronological listing of key events for the establishment and products provided by a CAAT.

a. Identify the issues, the required SMEs and task organization.

b. Pre-deployment.
      (1) Gathering and training of CAAT SMEs.
      (2) Development of collection plan.
      (3) Administration support, POM, request for theater clearance

c. Deployment-Employment-Redeployment
      (1) CAAT deploys.
      (2) CAAT collects (full team).
      (3) CAAT collects (reduced team).
      (4) CAAT prepares draft report and briefing.
      (5) CAAT redeploys.

d. Post Deployment.
      (1) Prepare and staff a coordinating draft.
      (2) Prepare the final report.
      (3) Approve and publish the final report.
      (4) Distribute the final report
      (5) Conduct briefings as required.

e. Key concerns for the development of a CAAT should always be considered. They are:
      (1) Funding for contingency operations is always needed.
      (2) Obtaining theater clearances is difficult and a slow process.
      (3) The team chief selection is critical. It must occur early in the planning process.
      (4) All aspects of the collection effort must be focused and understood early in the planning process by higher commands, the team chief and members of the CAAT.

When Operation JUST CAUSE began in Panama in December 1989, CALL personnel conducted the first combat collection effort under the WALLP. WALLP is explained in AR 11-33, October 1989, Army Lessons Learned Program: Systems Development and Application. Examples of recent CAATs include:

Exercise **PRAIRIE WARRIOR 1994** -
Focus: Tactical through Strategic Issues.

Operation **RESTORE HOPE** (Somalia) -
Focus: OOTW, Logistics, Battle Command, Deployment, Peace Enforcement Operations.

Bosnia Predeployment **CAAT** -
Focus: Trainup for deployment and operations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).

REFORGER 92 -
Focus: Operational - Level Issues.

REFORGER 93 -
Focus: Operational through Strategic Levels of War Issues.

Exercise **ULCHI FOCUS LENS 93** -
Focus: Tactical, Operational and Strategic Theater-Level Issues.
NFTF!

TRADOC REMEDIAL ACTION PROGRAM (T-RAP) UPDATE

by Rick Bogdan, Maneuver Analyst

Staffing is now complete for TR 500-xx (Draft), TRADOC Remedial Action Program (T-RAP), and changes have been incorporated.

At present the T-RAP regulation is in the approval process within TRADOC, with final approval by Commander, TRADOC, expected late in the summer.

T-RAP provides a systematic, regulatory procedure for the prioritization and resolution of issues within TRADOC. The system mirrors the procedures used both at Department of the Army and Joint Staff levels.

CALL will serve as TRADOC's executive agent for T-RAP. CALL will work directly with schools/centers and the Battle Labs to identify new issues and potential issue solutions. Additionally, CALL can assist lead issue proponents in developing viable Action Plans detailing the implementation of issue solution sets.

As the respective issue solutions, organized by Doctrine, Training, Leadership, Materiel, Organization, and Soldiers (DTLMOS) become implemented, CALL will also assist issue proponents in validating issue solutions.

The development of Army Force XXI InfoNet will put T-RAP "on-line" with the Army Remedial Action Program (ARAP), which is JULLS (Joint Universal Lessons Learned System) based. Proponents will be able to electronically update Action Plan milestones, as well as check the status of other working issues.

The entire remedial action process is designed to eliminate redundancy in developing issue solutions, while providing a systematic procedure to determine what should be fixed first. NFTF!

A Reminder!

If you have articles and lessons of interest to the
Total Force, please contact the Managing Editor, Dr.
Lon R. Seglie, at Coml (913) 684-3035/9567 or DSN
552-3035/9567; FAX DSN 552-9564.

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